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MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, MORTGAGE
MORALITY, AND MAIN STREET:
WHAT'S REALLY HAPPENING?

JENNIFER M. SMITH*

A bank is a place where they lend you an umbrella
in fair weather and askfor it back when it rains.I
INTRODUCTION

The American economy is in the tank. Millions of citizens are without
jobs, overwhelmed with credit card debt, and losing their homes. The
brighter side is that as a result, America has finally embraced financial
reform, 2 and the unstable economy is stabilizing marriages. 3 Nevertheless,
the United States remains in the midst of a housing crisis, and the ending

* Formerly, partner with Holland & Knight LLP, and federal judicial law clerk to the Honorable Joseph
W. Hatchett, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Currently, associate professor of law,
Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University College of Law. J.D., University of Miami School of
Law; B.S., Hampton University. Professor Smith expresses sincere gratitude for the research grant
provided by Florida A&M University; and the research assistance provided by LaKisha Davis, a FAMU
College of Law student, and the FAMU College of Law library assistants. Professor Smith was a
panelist on the St. John's University School of Law for THE JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT'S 17 t Annual Symposium, THE FALL OF THE ECONOMY, The Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis and Effect on Housing, Citizens, and Society, Queens, NY, March 2010.
I Robert Frost, Brainy Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/r/robertfrosl63221.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
2 Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2009-10) ("A bill to
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.").

3 DANNY SCHECHTER, PLUNDER, INVESTIGATING OUR ECONOMIC CALAMITY AND THE SUBPRIME
SCANDAL 165 (2008) (reporting that divorce filings are down 20 percent, about the same percentage as
the drop in real estate values (18 percent) for the same period in 2007).

525

526

JOURMALOF CIVLRIGH7S& ECONOACDEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 25:3

remains uncertain.
By the end of 2009, more than II million residential properties with
mortgages were "underwater" (that is had negative equity). 4 This equates to
roughly 24 percent of the nation's total homes. 5 As a whole, the national
picture appears dim; however, the concentration of these homes that are
underwater is in five states: in Nevada, 70 percent of homes are
underwater; in Arizona 51 percent are underwater; in Florida 48 percent are
underwater; in Michigan 39 percent are underwater; and in California 35
percent of homes are underwater. 6 These were also the states with some of
the most expensive and thus, unaffordable homes in the country, so they
made the best locations for new and exotic loans that formed the basis of
the subprime loan industry.7
Earlier in 2009, it appeared that mortgage delinquencies were down,
perhaps suggesting that the default crisis was peaking. But, by December
2009, foreclosure filings had increased, even though there was an alleged
effort to suspend these filings during the holidays. Presently, the states
with the highest foreclosure filings include: Nevada, Arizona, California,
and Florida.8 New York City was the nation's leading city for mortgage
fraud in 2009.9
In 2009, 22 percent of foreclosures - roughly one-fourth of all
foreclosures-were strategic,o meaning that the homeowner had no
financial hardship other than the fact that the home was underwater."l That
figure has increased in 2010 to about 31 percent.12 Currently, there are 16
4 Steve Cook, One Quarter of Mortgage Holders Sink Underwater, REAL ESTATE ECONOMY
WATCH (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.upi.com/Real-Estate/2010/02/23/One-Quarter-of-MortgageHolders-Sink-Underwater/9061266952157/ ("Negative equity, or 'underwater' or 'upside down,' means
that borrowers owe more on their mortgage than their homes are worth. Negative equity can occur
because of a decline in value, an increase in mortgage debt or a combination of both.").
5 Id
6 Id
7 See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov, & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulationand Regulatory Failure,41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 505 (2009);
see also MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION,

AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 34 ("More than one-third of the loans made in 2006
in the Central Valley of California and throughout south Florida were subprime."); Lisa Gibbs,
Drowning in Debt, CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/05/pf/home-debt.moneymag/index.
htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); Brent White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear,and
the Social Managementof the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971 (2009).
8 June U.S. Foreclosures-2.8% vs. May; -7% Y/Y, REALTY TRAC, July 14,2010, http://imarket
news.com/nodell6482.
9 Megan Mollman, America's Mortgage FraudCapital?New York, N. Y., AOL REAL ESTATE, Apr.
27, 2010, http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2010/04/27/new-york-is-nations-no- I-for-mortgage-fraudl.
10
Diana Olick, BofA: Mortgage Walkaways Have Huge Incentive, CNBC, June 2, 2010,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37471499/BofAMortgageWalkaways HaveHuge_1ncentive.
II White, supra note 7, at 979-80.
12 Olick, supra note 10.
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million homes with negative equity, and about ten million of those homes
are underwater by 20 percent or more. 13 As of 2007, lenders filed over six
million foreclosures against home owners and that number is projected to
double by 2010; more than one in four home owners owe more for their
property than what it is worth; and one in nine home owners are seriously
delinquent on their mortgage.14
There has been a media blitz about the housing crisis and Wall Street corporate interests, but much less about the actual impact of the housing
crisis on Main Street - America's working class people and small business
owners. This article will also provide insight into what is really happening
with the mortgage crisis and to Main Street America, why it is happening,
and what can be done to save Main Street.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Tulips, Houses, andBubbles
"Tulipmania," an obsession that the Dutch had with the tulip trade in the
first four decades of the Seventeenth century,' 5 has been compared with the
current housing crisis.16 Whether this comparison is appropriate depends
upon whether "Tulipmania" is "fact or artifact";' 7 it has been described as
both. 18
Modem references to Tulipmania begin with a recitation of the legend of
Holland's tulips from Clarence Mackay.19 Originating in Turkey, diffused
13 Calculated Risk, Negative Equity Breakdown, http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2010/07/
negative-equity-breakdown.html (July 31, 2010).
14 Center for Responsible Lending, Snapshot of a Foreclosure Crisis: 15 Fast Facts, March 17,
1, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/snapshot-of2010, at
foreclosure-crisis.pdf.
15 Scott Horton, The Bubble Bursts, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 27, 2008, availableat http://www.
harpers.org/archive/2008/01/hbc-90002258.
16
ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? 62 (2008) ("What has changed since the 1990s to make us

suddenly avid speculators in homes in so many different places? Trying to answer that question requires
that we go back to consider the forces that generate bubbles. Why, for example, was there a tulip mania
in Holland in the 1630s - and why has the speculative fascination with tulips since left our collective
consciousness?"); see also Bubble andBust, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2007, availableat http://www.
2007
081001912.html; Horton, supra note
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/10/AR
15.
17 Earl A. Thompson and Jonathan Treussard, The Tulipmania: Fact or Artifact (2002),
ANNE GOLDGAR, TULIPMANIA: MONEY
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/thompson-tulips.pdf;
HONOR, AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE 5-6 (2007).

18 GOLDGAR, supranote 17, at 2-3.
19 Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 537 (1989)(citing CLARENCE MACKAY,
EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS & THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1852)); GOLDGAR, supra note 17,
at 5 (citing CHARLES MCKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS
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into Western Europe in the mid-sixteenth century, and carried initially to
Australia, the tulip became accepted by the wealthy as a rare flower. 20 The
market, however, was not for flowers, but for the durable tulip bulbs.21 The
Dutch dominated this tulip market and began developing methods to create
varieties of beautiful tulips. 2 2 These tulip bulbs that resulted in unique
patterned flowers commanded high prices, unlike the tulip bulb that
produced common flowers. 23
In 1634, nonprofessionals entered the tulip trade in vast numbers, and the
tulip bulbs began to reach enormous prices. 24 By way of example, a
Semper Augustus bulb sold for the equivalent of $50,000.25 In February
1637, the contract prices of tulips were 20 times more than tulip prices in
November 1636 and May 1637.26 As the story goes, foreign monies began
entering the market, various economic classes of people liquidated other
assets to participate in this tulip trade. 27 Then the mania ended and almost
overnight, no market existed for these tulip bulbs, creating a lengthy
economic distress. 28 "A crash was inevitable. It came in 1637."29 The
collapse of this market disabled the Dutch economy for years, "establishing
a cautionary model of speculative excess that investors have learned from,
and ignored, in a seemingly endless cycle of bubble and bust ever since." 30
In the 1950's, the legend of Tulipmania was revived in respected
economic journals discussing the development of the capital theory. 31 In

(1852)) (pointing out that most of the modem-day images of the tulip are from Mackay's book).

20 See Garber,supranote 19, at 537.
21 Id
22 Id
23 Id
24 Id
25 See id. at 537; Bubble and Bust, supra note 16 (reporting that In 1637, at the peak of tulip mania,
tulip bulbs were selling for the equivalent of roughly $76,000 each, and tulip options were trading on
markets all over Europe); but see GOLDGAR, supra note 17, at 225 (noting discrepancies in the price
levels).
26 Thompson, supranote 17, at 2.
27 Garber, supranote 19, at 538.
28 Id
29 Horton, supra note 15; GOLDGAR, supra note 17, at 224.
30 See Bubble and Bust, supra note 16; see also Thompson, supra note 17 (concluding that
"tulipmania was not a bubble because bubbles require the existence of mutually-agreed-upon prices that
exceeded fundamental values. The 'tulipmania' was simply a period during which the prices in futures
contracts had been legally, albeit temporarily, converted into options exercise prices"); GOLDOAR,
supra note 17, at 7 ("Tulipmania did not destroy the economy, or even the livelihoods of most
participants. But that does not mean that tulipmania was not a crisis. It might not have been a financial
crisis, but it was a social and cultural one. In tulipmania, Dutch burghers confronted a series of issues
that in any case gripped their culture: novelty, the exotic, capitalism, immigration, the growth of urban
societies, and all the problems and excitement such issues raised").
31 Garber, supranote 19, at 537.
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the 1980's, Tulipmania appeared in financial literature. 32 And in 2007,
Tulipmania resurfaced as a comparison to the current housing bubble.
Prior to the housing bubble was the housing boom, which lasted from the
mid-1990s through the early 2000s, wherein there was a strong housing
demand by buyers desiring to keep their homes and a well-disciplined new
housing supply. 33 "The boom had been based on solid demand and supply
fundamentals: things such as affordable homes, strong incomes, and ample
household savings." 34 Then, the housing bubble, born out of the housing
boom, arrived without warning roughly around mid-2003.35 "The bubble
developed when Americans started buying not simply because they needed
someplace to live, but because they thought housing was a great
investment." 36 Then, the housing bubble began showing signs of leaking in
the second quarter of 2006 when real estate speculators left the market,
subprime loans were beginning to default, and adjustable rate mortgages'
(ARM) teaser rates were expiring. 37 By the summer of 2007, the subprime
crisis was in full swing, and it was now news that the housing market had
crashed. 38
This housing bubble bust has placed America's residential housing
market in a critical state, and the housing bubble has impacted countries
other than the United States and includes residential as well as commercial
real estate. 39 "[S]ubprime home buyers unable to make good on their
mortgage payments set off a financial avalanche in 2007 that pushed the
40
United States into a recession and hit major economies around the globe."
The U.S. economy was unstable by early 2008.41 "The bursting of the
housing bubble and the waves of mortgage defaults that followed brought
on the subprime shock; conversely, the shock and subsequent credit crunch
accelerated the housing crash." 42
32
33
34
35
36

37

Id.
See ZANDI, supra note 7, at 159 (explaining the housing boom of the 1990's and early 2000's).
Id. at 161.
See id.
Id. at 161-62.
See id. at 165-66; John Hull, Derivatives and Risk Management, The Financial Crisis of 2007:

Another Case of IrrationalExuberance, in THE FINANCE CRISIS AND RESCUE, WHAT WENT WRONG?
WHY? WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED? 17, 19-20 (2008).

38 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 167-68.
39 Christopher Mayer, Housing, Subprime Mortgages, and Securitization: How Did We Go Wrong
and What Can We Learn So This Doesn't Happen Again? 5-6, http://www.1010data.com/media/4317/
chris mayer_1010.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
40 See ZANDI, supra note 7, at 9; HERMAN M. SCHWARTZ, SUBPRIME NATION 200 (2009); see
also, Martin Wolf, FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE 3 (2008).

41 ZANDI, supranote 7, at 213.
42 See ZANDI,

supra

note

7,

at

215;

ADAM

B. ASHCRAFT AND TIL

SCHUERMANN,
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The subprime mortgage crisis has been compared to Tulipmania. 43
Subprime mortgages are loans "made to someone with a weak or troubled
credit history."44 Initially, it was believed that the poor, largely minorities,
were the main targets of these high interest loans; however, research has
shown that thousands of middle class, and even upper class, Americans
with strong credit histories also became victims of this subprime scam.
"Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of these paper commitments have
been made, gathered together and resold as bonds to hedge funds and banks
all over the world - which in turn have used them as collateral to obtain
more loans, so they can buy more bonds, and so on." 45 The subprime
market grew from $150 billion in 2000 to $650 billion in 2007 approximately 25 percent of the total mortgage market. 4 6 Then when
housing prices began to fall and borrowers began defaulting, the subprime
business began unraveling, and the world entered "the grip of a liquidity
crisis." 47 "The subprime mortgage crisis threatens this country with its
greatest economic downturn in the last 30 years, and perhaps since World
War II."48
B. Theories of the Housing Crisis

a. Background
Economists and other financial professionals have theorized that the
causes of the housing bubble have included "lack of regulation to too much
regulation; from political pressure on banks to extend mortgages to
unqualified buyers; to the greed of extravagantly compensated and arrogant
Wall Street financiers who created exotic financial instruments designed to
avoid capital requirements and attain extreme leverage; from conflicts of
interest on the part of appraisers, auditors, and rating agencies, to
incompetent regulators; and from the greed of homeowners to the greed of
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 27 (2008) (stating that

subprime borrowers typically declared bankruptcy in the last 5 years, and had a low credit bureau risk
score (FICO), high debt service t- income, a prior repossession, charge off, or foreclosure, or two or
more delinquencies in the past year or two); see also FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 77 (2008).
43 Bubble and Bust, supranote 16; Horton, supra note 15.
4 ZANDI, supranote 7, at 9.
45 Bubble and Bust, supra note 16.
46 Brian E. Robison, Litigation in the Wake of the Subprime Lending Collapse: What Has
Happenedand Where We Are, in FIRST Focus: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 59 (2008).

47 Bubble and Bust, supra note 16; Donald R. Kirk, How to Prepare for Subprime-Related
Litigation,in FIRST FocuS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 67 (2008) (the subprime mortgage affected U.S. and
global financial markets).
48 William R. Martin and Kerry Brainard Verdi, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Somebody Has to
Pay, in FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 107 (2008).
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lenders." 49 The Center for Responsible Lending (a pro consumer group)
reported that key financial experts primarily rest the housing crisis on poor
and risky mortgage products due to lax underwriting standards, coupled
with selfish, unethical lenders: 50
Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the FederalReserve Board:
That conclusion suggests that the best response to the housing bubble
would have been regulatory, not monetary. Stronger regulation and
supervision aimed at problems with underwriting practices and
lenders' risk management would have been a more effective and
surgical approach to constraining the housing bubble than a general
increase in interest rates. ("Monetary Policy and the Housing
Bubble, " a speech given at the annual meeting of the American
Economic Association in Atlanta, Georgia - January3, 2010).
Although the high rate of delinquency has a number of causes, it
seems clear that unfair or deceptive acts and practices by lenders
resulted in the extension of many loans, particularly high-cost loans,
that were inappropriate for or misled the borrower." (Written
statement by ChairmanBernanke, July 14, 2008).
Alan Greenspan,former chairmanof the FederalReserve Board
The big demand was not so much on the part of the borrowers as it
was on the part of the suppliers who were giving loans which really
most people couldn't afford." (Jon Meacham and Daniel Gross,
"The Oracle Reveals All, " Newsweek online, interview with
Greenspan).
Speaker Jon Husted,Ohio House ofRepresentatives (R)
We as a nation have $9.5 trillion in debt. This is $31,500 per
consumer. We have a consumer debt that is $8,300 per capita.
That is crippling our economy as a result. We have witnessed
49 Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 34-35
(2009); see Hull, supra note 37, at 28 (stating that several factors contributed to the financial crisis:
relaxed lending standards, complex products, products created to transfer the credit risk to investors,
and others); see also Michael Krimminger, "It's Alive!" - Mortgage Risk Reborn: Issues and Possible
Solutions, 17 J. AFF. HOUS. & COM. DEV. L. 259, 261 (2008) ("The current disruptions in the mortgage
markets can be traced fundamentally to poor underwriting"); James H. Carr & Katie Davidoff,
Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the ForeclosureCrisis, 17 J. AFF. Hous. & COM. DEV. L. 283,
284 (2008) ("Studies and reports on subprime loans have revealed problems in almost every aspect of
the subprime lending process. Inappropriate loan products, inadequate underwriting, bloated appraisals,
abusive prepayment penalties, excessive broker fees, steering of borrowers to high-cost products, and
servicing abuses have been widely reported.").
50 Center for Responsible Lending, What Caused the Financial Crisis? Quotes by Bankers and
OtherExperts, at 1, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/Quotes-WhatCaused-Crisis.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
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irresponsible lending as a major factor in slowing our economy.
It's not just consumers, but its very large banks and firms on
Wall
Street.
(http://california.newamerica.net/blogposts/2009/a
Jree market_
republicans_take-onpaydaylending-24660).
Brian T. Moynihan, CEO andPresident,Bank ofAmerica
Over the course of this crisis, we as an industry caused a lot of
damage. Never has it been clearer how mistakes made by
financial companies can affect Main Street, and we need to
learn the lessons of the past few years. (Testimony to Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) Washington, D.C. January 13, 2010).
In addition, in 2008 leaders of the Group of 20 advanced the following
as reasons for the crisis:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital
flows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade, market
participants sought higher yields without an adequate
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due
diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards,
unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and
opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage
combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policymakers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced
countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks
building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial
innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of
domestic regulatory actions. (Declaration of the Summit on
Financial Markets and the World Economy dated 15
November 2008).51
Thus, while various theories continue to float and while the blame game
is played, 52 what seems clear from the financial experts with various

51 Housing.com, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, http://www.housing.com/categories/foreclosures/
foreclosure-survival-guide/subprime-mortgage-crisis.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
52 SHILLER, supra note 16, at 175 ("The aftermath of the subprime crisis has involved considerable
finger-pointing."); ZANDI, supra note 7, at 126 ("Of all the places you can point the finger for the
housing bubble and subprime financial shock, perhaps the most deserving is the removal of
responsibility from the financial system."); Mark A. Flessner, The Subprime Crisis: Are Predatory
Lenders to Blame?, in FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 181 (2008) ("It is clear that these predatory

lenders deserve the blame for the current subprime crisis."); Brian E. Robison, Litigation in the Wake of
the Subprime Lending Collapse: What Has Happened and Where We Are, in FIRST FOCUS: THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS 60 (2008) (stating that lenders and borrowers gambled on the risky, high-reward
subprime loans).
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backgrounds and political foci is that, the subprime housing crisis is due in
large part to the lax mortgage underwriting standards and deceptive lending
practices by banks and other financial companies to borrowers at both ends
of the economic spectrum - the poor and the rich. As a result, defaults are
occurring rapidly and contagiously. 5 3 In fact, U.S. housing values are now
roughly mid-way down to their pre-bubble levels. 54
Subprime lending, however, has not been cited as the only cause; many
theories as to the cause of the actual housing crisis and subsequent
recession have been advanced. 55 What led to the subprime financial shock?
The theories of the leading causes have included government regulation,
government deregulation, and securitization. 56
b. Government Regulation
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 ("CRA")57 has been cited by
the political right as a primary cause of the housing crisis. 58 The CRA, a
federal law, mandated that financial institutions had to reinvest deposit
funds into the communities in which they operated. 59 "The CRA is based
upon the underlying notion that institutions have a continuing and
affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local
53 SHILLER, supra note 16, at 29.
54 Id.
55 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 29 ("Imagining how something as obscure as a subprime mortgage loan
could have brought the global financial system to its knees and pushed the U.S. economy into recession
might be hard."); id at 4-5 ("Even after mortgage loans started going bad en masse, the confusing mix
of federal and state agencies that made up the nation's regulatory structure had difficulty responding.
After regulators finally began to speak up about subprime and the other types of mortgage loans that
had spun out of control, such lending was already on its way to extinction. What regulators had to say
was all but irrelevant. Yet even the combination of a flawed financial system, cash-flush global
investors and lax regulators could not, by itself, have created the subprime financial shock. The
essential final ingredient was hubris: a belief that the ordinary rules of economics and finance no longer
applied."); Christopher A. Richardson, An Economic View of the Housing Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1133, 1137-38 (2009) (noting one cause of the mortgage crisis was "weak mortgage underwriting
standards"); Mayer, supra note 39, at 7 ("While subprime lending alone may not easily explain the
pattern of house price appreciation up to 2005, it surely was a strong contributing factor to the housing
bubble that developed in many U.S. cities afterwards.").
56 See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Bank Industry's Attack On
DisparateImpact Race DiscriminationClaims Under the FairHousing Act And the Equal Opportunity
Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2008) (providing an insightful cause of the crisis); Ellen Harnick,
Entrepreneurshipin the Global Economy: The Crisis in Housing and Housing Finance: What Caused
it? What Didn't? What's Next?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 625, 626 (2009) (explaining what
securitization is and theorizing that it has changed the traditional relationship between borrower and
lender).
57 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1977).
58 Aleo, supranote 56, at 11-13.
59 Christopher A. Richardson, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Economics of Regulatory
Policy, 29 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 1607, 1607 (2002); Vern McKinley, Community Reinvestment Act,
Ensuring Credit Adequacy or Enforcing Credit Allocation?, 17 REGULATION 25, 25 (1994), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl 7n4/vmck4-94.pdf.
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communities in which they are chartered." 60
Akin to the CRA are the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the
Fair Housing Act ("FHAct"), and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HMDA"), which were all enacted to eliminate discrimination in the
lending process. 6 1 "The [ECOA] prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a
credit transaction. It applies to any extension of credit, including
extensions of credit to small businesses, corporations, partnerships, and
trusts." 62 The FHAct prohibits discrimination in every aspect of
"residential real-estate related transactions," including but not limited to
"making loans to buy, build, repair or improve a dwelling"; "purchasing
real estate loans"; "selling, brokering, or appraising residential real estate";
or "selling or renting a dwelling." 63 The HMDA seeks to restrain
"redlining," in which lenders avoid loaning money in certain communities
due to their racial or ethnic composition. 64 "The CRA was enacted as a
follow-up to the HMDA, in part in response to instances in which a poor
white applicant had a significantly better chance of getting a mortgage loan
than a wealthy black applicant." 6 5 The ECOA, FHAct, HMDA, and the
CRA were enacted to ensure the availability of credit to all persons,
irrespective of income or demographics. 66 As a result of the CRA, access to
credit for low-income and minority borrowers has significantly increased. 67
The goals of these laws were to eradicate discrimination in the housing
60 McKinley, supra note 59, at 25; THE JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, THE 25' ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN
AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM (2002) [hereinafter ACCESS TO CAPITAL], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edulpublications/govementprograms/cra02-l.pdf (explaining that the CRA
was designed so that banks would help communities); see generally REPORT BY THE U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT (1961) [hereinafter

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report]., available at http://www.1aw.umaryland.edu/marshall/
usccr/documents/crl 1961bk4.pdf.
61 McKinley, supranote 59, at 26; ACCESS TO CAPITAL, supra note 60.
62 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL
(2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/IV-1.1 .pdf

1.1

63 Id.

6 Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, But
Strengthened FederalEnforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 293; Thomas B. Hatch &
Richard R. Zabel, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data Spawn Lawsuits by Minorities and Cities, in
FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 143 (2008).
65 McKinley, supranote 59, at 26; ACCESS TO CAPITAL, supra note 60 ("The Act responded
to the contention that savings and loans associations and banks were 'redlining' or systematically
denying credit to lower-income and minority neighborhoods. CRA advocates argued
that by restricting credit access based on neighborhood characteristics as opposed to the
creditworthiness of individual loan applicants, the actions of depositories were exacerbating urban
decline.").
66 McKinley, supra note 59, at 26.
67 Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005).
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market, to make affordable housing for a larger group of Americans, and in
some respects to streamline the purchasing process. It appears, that in an
effort to place blame, these admirable goals and the rationale behind them
have been forgotten.
Moreover, in an attempt to place blame and find a cause for the housing
crises, some politicians, economists, and others have determined that the
CRA is the root cause of the current housing crisis. Specifically, these
politicians, economists and others assert that in an effort to eradicate
discrimination in mortgage lending, risky financial products were thrust
upon low-income and minority borrowers, resulting in the housing crisis.68
As part of the political game, many right wing analysts place blame on the
CRA as an affirmative action - as opposed to an equal opportunity program in which lenders were forced to increase lending to minority
borrowers without assessing independent predatory lending practices
imposed upon unsuspecting borrowers due to lenders' own business
interests and poor judgment in decision-making. 69 In an effort to
purportedly comply with the CRA, however, lenders engaged in affirmative
discrimination by granting the majority of subprime home purchase loans
to minorities. 70 This is reflected in the chart below: 7 1

68 See Stan Liebowtiz, The Real Scandal - How Feds Invited the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. POST, Feb.
5, 2008, availableat http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/the-real-scandal
Qjl08vDbysbe6LWDxcqO3J (explaining that "the greatest scandal of the mortgage crisis is that it is a
direct result of an intentional loosening of underwriting standards - done in the name of ending
discrimination, despite warnings that it could lead to wide-scale defaults"); Ron Paul, Commentary:
Bailouts will lead to rough economic ride, CNN, Sept. 23, 2008, availableat http://www.cnn.com/
2008/POLITICS/09/23/paul.bailout/index; Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL
STREET J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21; Aleo, supra note 56, at 11-13 (discussing the severe political rights'
blame of the crisis on the CRA).
69 Aleo, supranote 56, at 11; see e.g., Ann Coulter, They Gave Your Mortgage to a Less Qualified
Minority (2008), http://www.anncoulter.com/cgi-local/printer-friendly.cgi?article=275.
70 Mayer, supra note 39, at 12 (noting, however, that often the mortgage brokers originating the
subprime loans to minorities for approval and acceptance by the banks, as well as many of the
appraisers, were often minorities as well).
71 Richard Marisco & Jane Yoo, Racial Disparities in Subprime Home Mortgage Lending in New
York City: Meaning and Implications,53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1011, 1020 (2008-09).
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15.6%
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4.5
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HSBC
Countrywide
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1.7%
23.0%
2.6%
33.7%
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5.7
17.7
6.4
3.3
3.9

1.6%
10.9%
2.3%
18.4%
14.3%

4.9
8.4
5.7
1.8
2.9

0.3%
1.3%
0.4%
10.8%
5.0%

JP
Chase

Thus, this chart shows that for all major lenders African-Americans and
Latinos were much more likely to receive a subprime loan than whites. For
example, African-Americans received a subprime loan 17.7 times and
Latinos 8.4 times more than whites from Wells Fargo. 7 2 So lenders
"gamed" the CRA for their benefit by imposing risky financial products on
their customers and minorities much more often than whites, but as
discussed below whites - even wealthy whites - did not escape becoming
victims of these sub-prime loans.
Significant evidence shows that indeed the CRA was not that cause of
the housing crisis. To begin, the CRA was not responsible because it did
not regulate most of the significant subprime lenders. 73 Furthermore,
studies found that lending to lower-income individuals and
communities has been nearly as profitable and performed
similarly to other types of lending done by CRA-covered
institutions. Thus, a fair reading of the statute and regulations
and the long-term evidence shows that the CRA has not
pushed banks into extending loans that perform out of line

72 Id.
73 See Luci Ellis, The Housing Meltdown: Why Did it Happen in the United States? 5, fn.6 (Bank
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 259, Sept. 2008), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/work
259.pdfnoframes=1; Governor Randall S. Kroszner, Speech at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty
Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2008l203a.htm (claiming that
the CRA was in no way causally linked to the foreclosure crisis); Sheila Bair, Remarks to The New
America Foundation Conference: Did Low-income Homeownership Go Too Far? (Dec. 17, 2008),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spdecl708.html ("CRA
as a scapegoat.").
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with their traditional businesses. 74
Also, lenders imposed subprime loans not only on the borrowers with
weak credit histories, but also borrowers with strong credit histories;
lenders pushed these loans on the minority communities, as well as wealthy
non-minorities. 75 Additionally, economists "analyzed mortgage-related
data to assess such arguments and found no empirical evidence to support
the claim that the CRA was a major contributor to the subprime crisis." 76
Also, "the subprime crisis did not begin until a quarter century after the
enactment of the CRA, and Congress weakened the CRA regulations in late
2004 to exclude small and mid-sized banks from its more stringent
requirements - yet the subprime market continued to grow." 77
Finally, one economist concluded: "The proposition that the Community
Reinvestment Act caused all the bad stuff, because government forced
helpless bankers into lending to Those People, has been refuted up, down,
and sideways. The vast bulk of subprime lending came from institutions
not subject to the CRA."78 Nevertheless, some continue to believe that it is
likely that the CRA may have played some minor role in the economic
crisis. 79 This conclusion, however, seems more politically charged than
74 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, No Evidence of CRA Role in the Crisis (2010), available
at, http://www.phil.frb.org/publications/annual-report/2008/no-evidence.cfm [hereinafter No Evidence
of CRA Role] (quoting Kroszner, supranote 73).
75 Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, WALL STREET
J., Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl19662974358911035.html; Bernard
Condon, Mortgage Crisis Shuffles Towards FancierNeighborhoods, FORBES, Oct. 7, 2009, availableat
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/07/real-estate-mortgages-foreclosures-personal-finance-crisis.html
("Many of the well-off took out "option-ARM" or "Alt-A" loans. The attraction: Little or no proof of
income to qualify for the loans and, often, artificially low payments for five years after they were
granted. Problem is, these loans demand higher catch-up payments in later years so even if rates fall,
monthly bills will rise.").
76 See No Evidence of CRA Role, supra note 73; see also Center for Responsible Lending, supra
note 50, at 2, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/Quotes-WhatCaused-Crisis.pdf (quoting John Dugan, Comptroller of Currency: "CRA [the Community
Reinvestment Act, a longstanding program for encouraging more lending in minority neighborhoods] is
not the culprit behind the subprime mortgage lending abuses, or the broader credit quality issues in the
marketplace.").
77 Aleo, supra note 56, at 14 (citations omitted).
78 Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal: Armey of Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/l 1/1 0/armey-of-ignorance/ (Nov. 10, 2009) (opining also that
commercial real estate lending to rich white developers is in much worse shape than subprime home
lending); see Mayer, supra note 39, at 7 (arguing that subprime lending and securitization or any other
U.S. specific factor cannot fully explain the housing market boom globally for commercial real estate).
79 See Hardaway, supra note 49, 36 ("Indeed, there is now little doubt that its progeny in the form
of regulations promulgated in the mid 1990s with the purpose of putting teeth into the CRA by setting
quotas for mortgage lending to distressed communities and threatening sanctions for banks who did not
meet them, played at least some role in the collapse, through the extent of its role remains fiercely
debated."); but see Randall Kroszner, Lending to Poor Didn't Spur Crisis, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0332633420081203 ("[T]he very small share of all
higher-priced loan originations that can reasonably be attributed to the CRA makes it hard to imagine
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accurate.
c. Government Deregulation
As the political right blames regulation - the CRA as a misguided piece
of affirmative action legislation - for the current housing crisis, the
political left blames deregulation of the Reagan years for the crisis. In the
1980s, Congress enacted two landmark pieces of legislation that are
thought to have played a role in the current economic crisis - the 1980
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
("DIDMCA")80 and the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of
1982 ("AMTP"), which is part of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act. 8 1
The DIDMCA abolished all usury caps on first lien residential
mortgages, including state usury caps. 82 Thus, opening the floodgates for
loans to riskier borrowers and continuing to allow more low-to-moderate
income individuals home ownership. 83 The AMTPA lifted the ban on
conventional-only, fixed rate loans to riskier loan products. 84 The types of
loans that the AMTPA allowed were: adjustable-rate mortgages, 85 balloonpayment mortgages, 86 interest-only mortgages,8 7 and the option-ARM. 88
how this law could have contributed in any meaningful way to the current subprime crisis.").
80 Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in various sections of title 12 of the U.S. Code).
81 McCoy, supra note 7, at 501; Timothy Canova, FinancialMarket FailureAs a Crisis in the Rule
of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REv. 369, 376-77 (2009).
82 See 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) ("The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State
expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges
which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, credit sale, or
advance. , . .").
83 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 6 ("The subprime loan was crafted for this [weak credit poor
minority] community and promoted as a reform, a positive way for minorities to become part of the
American Dream of homeownership for all").
84 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 35 ("The fixed-rate mortgage loan, in which monthly mortgage
payments never change, no matter what happens to interest rates or financial markets"); Howard
Mulligan, As Lawmakers Tackle the Subprime Crisis, ProfessionalVigilance is a Must, in FIRST Focus:
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, 79 (2008).
85 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 16 ("ARMs allowed for low monthly payments, at least for a while.");
Harnick, supra note 56, at 628 (defining hybrid ARMs as risky loans that were also known as the
"2/28" or "3/27" because the interest rate was fixed for the first two or three years out of a 28 or 27 year
term, and at the end of the fixed period (two or three years) for these loans, the interest rates would
increase dramatically); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, REv. FIN. STUDIES 8 (2009), http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2009/05/04/rfs.hhp33
.full.pdf (defining hybrid mortgages as having a "fixed rate for an initial period (typically 2 or 3 years)
and then the rate resets to a reference rate (often the 6-month LIBOR) plus a margin").
86 Demyanyk, supra note 85 (defining a balloon mortgage as one that "does not fully amortize over
the term of the loan and therefore requires a large final (balloon) payment").
87 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 38 ("Interest-only ARMs allow borrowers to forgo principal payments");
FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 77 (2008).
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These are the kinds of loans that are causing borrowers to default on their
mortgages because the initial loan payments significantly increase at some
point during the initial years of the loans. These two landmark bills created
the deregulatory environment in which these risky loans flourished. 89
"[Subprime loans] were made possible by deregulation lobbied for by
financial institutions, credit card companies, and homebuilders, the
industries most likely to benefit." 90 Thus, a subprime market was bom.
America's housing boom occurred during the years of 2000 through
2006 at which time it began to decline. 9 1 During this time, obtaining a
home was relatively easy. In fact, obtaining a home beyond what a
borrower could properly afford was easy and became the norm. The
demand for houses increased during this boom, and many people made
money at all levels from the sellers to the middle persons to the lenders on
Wall Street. As the demand for housing increased, it pushed housing prices
to a higher level. 92 Adjustable rate mortgages ("ARM") comprised the
lion's share of the subprime lending market. Indeed, 80% of subprime
loans were adjustable rate mortgages. 9 3 Often, the lender assessed the noncreditworthy borrower for a loan as if the ARM was for the entire 30 year
mortgage rather than the two or three year "ARM", so when the ARM
adjusted, the borrower was unable to continue making the increased
monthly payment. For example, during the boom, the initial 8% interest
rate would increase two or three years later to 10% or more. 94 When the
interest adjusted the borrowers defaulted, and the borrowers who thought
they could or tried to sell their home to obtain a release from the subprime
loan could not do so because the home values had decreased. 95 In addition,
88 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 38 ("Option ARMs give borrowers a choice; they may make standard
interest and principal payments, pay only the interest, or pay only a minimum amount that doesn't even
cover the interest due. Interest not paid is added back into the loan principal. This is known as negative
amortization"); Mulligan, supra note 84, at 77.
89 See Cassandra Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime
Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 234 (2006); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics ofSubprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
90 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 5.
91 Will Subprime Mess Ripple Through Economy? MSNBC-Business, March 13, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17584725.
92 Stock Market Investors, Subprime Mortgage Crisis Explained, http://www.stock-marketinvestors.com/stock-investment-risk/the-subprime-mortgage-crisis-explained.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
93 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Dodd: Create, Sustain,
Preserve, and Protect the American Dream of Home Ownership, February 7, 2007,
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecord-id=
e2e529cO-29ee-43db-a314-ecafb3bdee32&Region id=&Issueid=.
94 Harnick, supra note 56, at 628.
95 President Bush's Speech to the Nation on the Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/economy/24textbush.html? r-3&page
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refinancing opportunities were curtailed because the housing market was
declining. 96 These borrowers could not afford the loans that the lenders
offered them, and these borrowers often did not fully understand what they
were entering into when they accepted ARM mortgages. 9 7 To add to this,
borrowers were encouraged to refinance and "pull-out" the equity in their
homes. This resulted from the belief and expectation that real estate always
appreciates. Therefore, a borrower who purchased a home, that he really
could not afford, was soon bombarded with opportunities to refinance his
home because it had certainly appreciated in the few years since the initial
purchase. The refinance now placed the borrower in an even more
precarious situation because he now owed even more on a house that was
inflated in value when it was initially purchased. This merry-go-round of
purchase, refinance, purchase, provided the basis for unscrupulous
mortgage companies and banks to continue to flourish.
After this housing boom began to decline in 2007, roughly $1.3 trillion
in subprime mortgages were outstanding. 98 During this time, home
ownership rose about 5% from approximately 64% in 1994 to 69.2 in
2004.99
The housing boom years were golden for many. New homeowners were
obtaining loans that they ultimately could not afford, then they were
offered home equity lines on top of the first mortgage, and consumers were
saving less money.' 00 Average household debt rose to $14 trillion in 2008,
which reflected a significant increase from $680 billion in 1974, roughly 35
years earlier.'01 In addition, the average household income did not increase
in comparison to the rising household debt and housing prices.10 2 Unable to

wanted=1 &oref-slogin.
96 Id
97 Harnick, supra note 56, at 630; Gretchen Morgenson, Illinois to Sue Countrywide, N.Y. Times,
June 25, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/business/25mortgage.html?r-I1&emc
=etal.
98 Will Subprime Mess Ripple Through Economy?, supra note 91.
99 Robert R. Callis & Linda B. Cavanaugh, Census Bureau Reports On Residential Vacancies And
Homeownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/hvs/qtr307/q3O7press.pdf.
100 Tim lacono, Home Equity Extraction: The Real Cost of 'Free Cash' (Apr. 25, 2007),
(noting that
http://seekingalpha.com/article/33336-home-equity-extraction-the-real-cost-of-free-cash
"home sales, home equity loans, and cash-out refinancing - all [.. contribute to what is appropriately
(and ironically) termed "free cash").
101 Fareed Zakaria, There Is a Silver Lining, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/10/10/there-is-a-silver-lining.htmi (explaining that "during 2008, the
typical USA household owned 13 credit cards, with 40% of households carrying a balance, up from 6%
in 1970").
102 Stock Market Investors, supranote 92.
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refinance and pay a steep prepayment penalty, 103 unable to afford the
increased mortgage, and saddled with new and higher debt, borrowers were
trapped and began to default. This housing crisis was only a matter of time
because the lax regulations and the risky loan products created a housing
mess. 104 It is true that Americans borrowed more than they could
realistically pay for homes, but American corporations also lent money
using unstable and risky financial products. 0 5 As early as 2006, there was
a noticeable increase in the number of homeowners who began to default
and ended up in foreclosure as a result of their inability to make mortgage
payments.1 06 It is anticipated that within the next five years, one out of
every six homeowners will end up in foreclosure unless homeowners in
distress can restructure their current home loan.10 7 "[D]eregulation in effect
gave the industry - whose deposits were federally insured - a license to
gamble with taxpayers' money, at best, or simply to loot it, at worst. By
the time the government closed the books on the affair, taxpayers had lost
$130 billion, back when that was a lot of money." 0 8 Some would argue
that deregulation cleared the way for a plundering of America. 109
d. Securitization
Securitization, a Wall Street innovation,110 is another leading cause-or
perhaps more appropriately an exacerbation-of the foreclosure crisis.' 11
"Fundamentally, loans are either financed directly by financial institutions
such as commercial banks and thrift institutions, or are repackaged as
bonds (that is, securitized) and sold to investors, who keep or trade them in
103 See John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The Geography of Subprime Mortgage
PrepaymentPenalty Patterns, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 687, 689 (2004).
104 Stock Market Investors, supra note 92.
105 Hamick, supra note 56, at 625.
106 Foreclosures,N.Y TIMES, May 6, 2010, availableat http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/f/foreclosures/index.html?scp=3&sq=housing%20boom%20and%20subprime&stcse.
107 Hamick, supra note 56, at 625-26.
108 Paul Krugman, Reagan Did It, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/06/01/opinion/lkrugman.html; but see Bill Fleckenstein, Blame Reagan for Our Financial
Mess, MSN MONEY, June 8, 2009, availableat http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/
ContrarianChronicles/blame-reagan-for-our-financial-mess.aspx.
109 See generally SCHECHTER, supra note 3.
110 Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The FinancialCrisis Blame Game, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct.
18, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2008/pi20081017_950382
.htm.
Ill Krimminger, supra note 49 at, 263 ("Securitization did not create the problem; poor
underwriting did. Securitization has contributed to unprecedented levels of homeownership in this
country by expanding the availability of credit to lower-income Americans and the liquidity of the
credit markets.").
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global financial markets. The overwhelming majority of subprime loans
have been securitized."ll 2
At the start of the twenty-first century, the traditional manner of buying a
home changed. Mortgage bankers came on the scene - these mortgage
"bankers" are not banks, but instead they are "companies that raise funds
they lend, not through bank deposits, but by borrowing money from
investment banks or commercials banks, and repaying that money by
selling to investors the right to share in the proceeds of the mortgage
payments received from borrowers," which process is known as
"securitization." 11 3 This change was significant because traditionally
mortgage lenders had a long-term stake in the mortgage loan until the
borrower repaid it, but under securitization, the mortgage lender that
originated the loan and defined the terms no longer had a stake in the
success or failure of the borrower repaying the loan.11 4 These
securitizations were risky and because the originating lender had no stake
in the loan, the lenders increasingly became careless in their lending
practices.11 5 Securitized mortgages contributed to poor underwriting
practices, in that neither the loan originators nor the investors were
concemed about whether the loans they originated could be repaid by the
borrowers, and borrowers were systematically put into loans that they could
not repay.'1 6 Securitizations ultimately led to "poor quality loans made by
originators and brokers with incentives that some of them to lend to anyone
who would sign on the dotted line."' 1 7 It is said that Wall Street created all
of the subprime mortgage-backed securities.118
Large mortgage finance companies and banks made big bucks
on sub-prime loans. Last year, 10 lenders - Countrywide, New
112 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 41; SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 7 ("The percentage of subprime
mortgage securitized rose rapidly after 2001, reaching a peak value of more than 81 percent in 2005.");
Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 217, 220 (2009), available at
http://www.albanygovemmentlawreview.org/articles/2/1/Samuel.pdf ("The bubble that burst began to
inflate with mortgage loans made by an array of financial institutions to high risk home buyers; these
loans were consolidated into securities packages issued by financial institutions that were then
repackaged and sold to other financial institutions and to other investors.").
113 Harnick, supra note 56, at 626.
114 Id., at 627; SCHECHTER, supranote 3, at 9.
115 Harnick, supra note 56, at 627 (explaining that a CEO of one mortgage lender said "the market
is paying me to do a no-income-verification loan more than it is paying me to do the full documentation
loans.. .What would you do?"); Hull, supra note 37, at 23 ("[Tlhe question was not 'Is this a credit we
want to assume?' Instead it was 'Is this a mortgage we can make money on by selling it to someone
else?').
116 Mayer, supranote 39, at 3-4.
117 Id. at 30.
118 Harnick, supra note 56, at 634 (citations omitted).
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Century, Option One, Fremont, Washington Mutual, First
Franklin, RFC, Lehman Brothers, WMC Mortgage, and
Ameriquest - accounted for 59 percent of all sub-prime loans,
totaling $284 billion.
Wall Street investment firms set up special investment units,
bought the sub-prime mortgages from the lenders, bundled
them into "mortgage-backed securities," and for a fat fee sold
them to wealthy investors around the world.1 19
Securitization continued for years and was highly profitable for lenders
and investors, "securitization facilitated a large transfer of wealth to
lenders, Wall Street, and global investors, from the most vulnerable
segment of the American middle class [Main Street], who are now losing
their homes to boot."120 The most tragic aspect is that most subprime loan
borrowers qualified for prime loans with far better terms. 12 1 Even those
borrowers who did not qualify for a prime loan, did qualify for safer loans
with far better terms than they were given, such as a thirty-year fixed-rate
loan which would have provided a stable mortgage payment.122 Thus, the
fraud perpetrated on the borrowers within these subprime loans was due to
the lenders choosing to offer substandard products to their borrowers
because of greed.123
When federal government regulators intervened in 2007 and proposed
that lenders determine whether borrowers would be able to afford their
loans after the ARMs ended, lenders resisted.124 Noteworthy, Countrywide
protested in writing and essentially admitted that roughly 60 percent of its
borrowers who received subprime hybrid ARM loans in the end of 2006
would not have met the lending qualifications.1 25 In fall 2010, Countrywide
settled several class action lawsuits in the amount of $600 million that
alleged that "Countrywide concealed mounting risks as it loosened its
standards for loans." 26 Specifically, "[t]he FTC says Countrywide
charged excessive fees for services such as property inspections, inflated
SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 9.
120 Harnick, supra note 56, at 628.
121 Id. at 629.
122 Id
123 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 23 (quoting millionaire Michael Blomquist who alleges that real
estate financiers bilked him out of his money: "Our current credit and housing crisis was not created
from low interest rates or 'laxed' guidelines. This crisis was created by unconscionable greed, breaches
of fiduciary duties, lack of regulation, embezzlement and fraud.").
124 Harnick, supranote 56, at 630.
125 Id, at 631; SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 12.
126 $600 Million Countrywide Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2010, at B5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/business/03countrywide.html.
119
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the amount owed when borrowers filed for bankruptcy protection, and
didn't tell people when new fees or charges were being added to their
loans." 2 7 This is the largest settlement yet from the subprime mortgage
crisis.128 This settlement followed a $108 million settlement from Bank of
America, which has since purchased Countrywide, that was to refund
customers who had mortgages from Countrywide.1 29 Citibank, Goldman
Sachs, AIG, and other Wall Street giants have paid huge settlements for
fraudulent conduct related to the subprime mortgage crisis. 130 Thus, it is
clear that Wall Street knew the fraudulent games it was playing with Main
Street's money, but Wall Street followed greed. Wall Street profited
handsomely at the expense of Main Street.
Curiously, Main Street is not the population who comprises the biggest
defaulters in this housing crisis. While the crisis appears to have begun in
the lower income communities, it moved to the middle class
neighborhoods, and now includes the wealthy. The media blitz has
Americans believing that poor people caused this subprime crisis, but not
one homeowner approved their own loan or appraised their own property;
the lenders allowed no documentation loans ("liar loans") because they did
not care. 13 1 Main Street is being blamed for this crisis - specifically, noncreditworthy borrowers have been deemed irresponsible,132 but in reality
the biggest defaulters are the wealthy.133 Whereas one in 12 of Main Street
borrowers are in default, a study shows that one in seven of America's
wealthy are in default.134

127 Michelle Singletary, FTC Wins Countrywide Settlement, WASH. POST, June 10, 2010, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060905931 html.
128 $600 Million Countrywide Settlement, supranote 126, at B5.
129 Singletary, supranote 127.
130 Robert A. Mintz, Don't Bank on Subprime Indictments Anytime Soon, HUFFINGTON POST,
Aug., 16,2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-a-mintz/dont-bank-on-subprimeind-b683869
.html.
131 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 7 (reporting that no documentation loans - loans in which the
borrower is unable to verify employment, income or other credit related information - increased from
28 percent to more than 50 percent as housing sales boomed).
132 Harnick, supra note 56, at 634; SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at xxi-xxii (reporting that Hedge
Fund Manager John Devaney, CEO of United Capital Markets, was known for calling borrowers
"idiots" for entering into loans that he and his colleagues pedaled).
133 David Streitfeld, Biggest Defaulters on Mortgages are the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at
Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/business/economy/09rich.html?pagewanted=
I&r-1 ("Whether it is their residence, a second home or a house bought as an investment, the rich
have stopped paying the mortgage at a rate that greatly exceeds the rest of the population.").
134 Id
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II. MAIN STREET & MORTGAGE MORALITY
Now, Main Street, that is, America's working class and small business
owners, is saddled with real estate that is not worth the money owed, and
the current creditors who harass them for payment are not the same ones
who originated the loan or established any relationship with Main Street.
Some homeowners just "walked away"l 35 from their homes when the crash
hit, but this was not the most common scenario; most homeowners wanted
to work harder to stay current on the mortgage and stay in their home, even
if it was "underwater." 36 The lenders knew that walking away for many
homeowners was probably the best thing they could do for themselves.
Indeed "[O]n Freddie Mac's Web site, the company's executive vice
president, Don Bisenius, acknowledged that walking away "might well be a
good decision for certain borrowers."l 3 7 Yet, lenders said that homeowners
who walk away are "trashing their communities."13 8 Various propertysaving programs have been offered by the government, but they have not
had much success. 139
Main Street is perceived as one of the chief culprits of the housing
crisis.140 "It is now frequently asserted that the housing crisis was caused
by borrowers who took on mortgages when they never should have owned
homes in the first place."l41 As was said with Tulipmania -that "those
doing the investing were the wrong people, those who, because of their low
social station, should not have been allowed to submit to the temptation of
easy money," 4 2 so it is said with the subprime crisis - poorer people
135 Eric Weiner, Why Not Just Walk Away from a Home?, February 13, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=18958049 (defining "walking away" as giving
the mortgage and the house back to the bank).
136 Id
137 Streitfeld, supra note 133, at Al.
138 See id (quoting Freddie Mac's company executive); see also News Release, Fannie Mae,
Fannie Mae Increases Penalties for Borrowers Who Walk Away: Seven Year Lockout Policy for
Strategic Defaulters (June 23, 2010), http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2010/5071.jhtml
(quoting Terence Edwards, Fannie Mae executive vice president for credit portfolio management:
"Walking away from a mortgage is bad for borrowers and bad for communities and our approach is
meant to deter the disturbing trend toward strategic defaulting.").
139 Double-Dip Drama, THE ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010, at 35, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/l6438759; see also Lita Epstein, Underwater Borrowers Get a
Lifeline on Sept. 7, http://realestate.aol.com/article/experian/ alunderwater-borrowers-get-a-lifeline-onseptember-7/201009020001 (reporting a new government program that starts September 7, 2010 and
ends December 12, 2012 in which a borrower may be able to obtain a fixed-rate FHA loan with a
principal reduction of ten percent of the unpaid balance of the first mortgage, but the borrower's lien
holders must consent to for the borrower to participate in the program, called the FHA Short Refinance
Option).
140 Harnick, supranote 56, at 633.
141 Id
142 GOLDGAR, supranote 17, at 5.
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should not have pursued the American dream of home ownership. Blaming
the "irresponsible" borrower who should never have bought a home in the
first place "allows justification for a harshness toward the individuals
concemed."l 43 Yet, this harshness is misplaced as most subprime
borrowers qualified for better (prime'44 or a less costly thirty year loan),
but "these borrowers were taken advantage of by mortgage brokers and
lenders who were happy to pass the risks onto far-flung investors."l 45
Mortgage lenders created cultures that "encouraged [their] sales personnel
to engage in deceptive and fraudulent conduct." 46 Financial institutions
targeted the poor and working class who wanted to improve their lives and
own new homes.147
Evidence flies in the face of the assertion that subprime loan borrowers
obtained risky loans to obtain mansions because the average subprime loan
was $205,700 and this included the high-priced California market,14 8 and
"the overwhelming majority of subprime mortgages made from 1998
through 2006 went to borrowers who already owned their own homes",
thus "subprime lending actually resulted in a net reduction in
homeownership."l 49 Furthermore, subprime products offered to subprime
borrowers were intentionally very complicated and thus there was great
room for misrepresentation and misunderstanding.50 As a result, there was
excessive predatory lending' 5 ' and excessive predatory borrowing.152
Predatory loans typically include excessive fees, abusive prepayment
143 Harnick, supra note 56, at 634.
144 See ZANDI, supra note 7, at 31 (defining a prime borrower as "someone lenders are eager to do
business with because the person has a good history of debt repayment."); see also Linda Finely &
Frederick Salvo, Consumers Were the Real Victims of Georgia'sPredatoryLaw, in FIRST FOCUS: THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS 171, 171 (2008).
145 Harnick, supra note 56, at 634.
146 Robert Ridge & Lauren D. Rushak, Identifying the Categoriesof Disputes Emergingfrom the
Subprime Meltdown, in FIRST Focus: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 1, 12-13 (2008) (quoting New York
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo who stated that Ameriquest had created such an environment; noting
that Washington Mutual used appraisers who would inflate the home values).
147 SCHECHTER, supranote 3, at 77.
148 Harnick, supra note 56, at 634 (citing data collected from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
for loans made in 2006).
149 Id. (citing Center for Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgagelending/research-analysis/Net-Drain-in-Home-Ownership).
150 ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 42, at 32; SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 20 (reporting
that subprime loans were carefully engineered and designed to fail).
151 ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 42, at 101 (defining predatory lending as having at
least one of these: "[m]aking unaffordable loans based on the assets of the borrower rather than on the
borrower's ability to repay an obligation; [i]nducing a borrower to refinance a loan reportedly in order
to charge high points and fees each time the loan is refinanced ("loan flipping"); or [e]ngaging in fraud
or deception to conceal the true nature of the loan obligation, or ancillary products, from an
unsuspecting or unsophisticated borrower").
152 Id. at 21 (explaining implications of predatory lending).
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penalties, kickbacks to brokers, loan flipping, unnecessary products,
mandatory arbitration, and offers of subprime products when borrowers
qualified for prime products.1 53
In the early 1800's Thomas Jefferson remarked: "I believe that banking
institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies."1 54
The blame game has fallen back on Main Street, when the real culprit is
Wall Street - Wall Street "trashed [American] communities." Wall Street
has acknowledged that the easy money was too hard to pass up, and the
Lenders and brokers
well-being of the borrowers was ignored.
intentionally deceived borrowers by offering complex products, knowing
the borrowers did not understand the terms and that the borrower could not
repay the loan.
The truth is that many of us in the industry were deeply
distressed by the growing practice of pushing high risk loans
on borrowers who had no reasonable expectation of being able
to repay the mortgage. Disclosures were often less than
adequate, and faced with a bewildering array of loan terms,
borrowers tended to trust their mortgage banker or broker. The
broken trust that resulted has damaged borrower confidence in
the mortgage industry. I liken the situation to that of a doctor
and patient dealing with a medical procedure. The patient
bears some reasonable risk. But they don't bear the risk of
malpractice by the doctor. In our industry, we have frankly
seen too much mortgage malpractice. (Testimony of Scott
Stern, CEO of Lenders One before the Senate Banking
Committee Washington, D.C. April 10, 2008).155
During the lending boom, the industry developed products that
were "extremely risky that were pushed by everybody up and
down the food chain," Mr. Robbins said. "We forgot about our
customers, and making money and our commission checks
were more important," he said. (Kate Berry, "Wachovia Alum
Has Tips for an Industry Rebound," American Banker
(September 15,2008) quoting John Robbins, long-time industry
executive and former chairman of the Mortgage Bankers
Association).156

153 Id. at 104 (citing the Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 50).
154 Laurence Booth, Subprime, Market Meltdown, and Learning from the Past, in THE FINANCE
CRISIS AND RESCUE 35 (2008) (quoting Thomas Jefferson in The Debate over the Re-charter of The
Bank Bill (1809)).
155 Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 50.
156 Id.
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Now, Wall Street is withdrawing the initial support offered to help
borrowers restructure the subprime loans; the economy has not bounced
back; and foreclosures are increasing.1 57 Main Street advisors say "walk
away" from the obligations made with Wall Street and others that
originated these loans,158 and Wall Street and others in America say that is
irresponsible and immoral. Main Street, they say, must honor its mortgage
loan obligations because that is what those Americans committed to do
when they entered into the loan. 159
What Wall Street did to Main Street showed America that: "This is
business not personal."l 60 "Lending to American homebuyers had been one
of the least risky and most profitable businesses a bank could engage in for
nearly a century."l 6 1 But Wall Street got greedier than usual.1 62 Wall Street
intentionally defrauded Main Street because Wall Street's goal was to
make money at any cost, even at the cost of America's working middle
class.1 63 This crisis has essentially eviscerated the middle class, which for
so long had increased their economic status through home ownership.1 64
157 See Allyson Gold, Interpreting the Protecting Tenants at ForeclosureAct of 2009, 19 J. AFF.
HOUSING & COM. DEv. L. 205, 205 (2010).
158 See generally White, supra note 7 (discussing how many homeowners are abandoning their
mortgage payments); Streitfeld, supra note 133 (explaining how in certain instances "walking away"
might be a good decision for some borrowers).
159 Streitfeld, supra note 133 ("Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two quasi-governmental mortgage
finance companies that own most of the mortgages in America with a value of less than $500,000, are
alternately pleading with distressed homeowners not to be bad citizens and brandishing a stick at
them... Freddie Mac's Web site, the company's executive vice president, Don Bisenius, acknowledged
that walking away "might well be a good decision for certain borrowers" but argues that those who do it
are trashing their communities.").
160 Memorable Quotes for the Godfather, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0068646/quotes (last visited
Feb. 10, 2011).
161 ZANDI, supranote 7, at 1.
162 SCHECHTER, supranote 3, at xxiii (reporting that populist Jim Hightower said: "At its core, this
is a classically simple story of banker greed and outright sleaze. And the astonishing part is that nearly
all of the rank injustice perpetrated by today's money changers is considered legal and is practiced by
supposedly reputable financial firms"); SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 160 (reporting economic advisor
Carly Fiorina: "there was a situation where there was greed on Wall Street, there was a lack of
transparency around a new set of financial instruments . . . there were a whole new set of financial
players who were less regulated then banks, and all that together created a situation, which now is
rippling through the economy").
163 Id. at 38 (reporting that investor Warren Buffet said: "Wall Street is going to go where the
money is and not worry about consequences").
164 See SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting the Senate's Joint Economic Committee's
findings: "Approximately $71 billion in housing wealth will be directly destroyed through the process
of foreclosures. More than $32 billion in housing wealth will be indirectly destroyed by the spillover
effect of foreclosures, which reduce the value of neighboring properties. States and local governments
will lose more than $917 million in property tax revenue as a result of the destruction of housing wealth
caused by subprime foreclosures"); see also David Streitfeld, Housing Fades as a Means to Build
Wealth, Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08
/23/business/economy/23decline.html (reporting that "many real estate experts now believe that home
ownership will never again yield rewards like those enjoyed in the second half of the 2 0 ' century, when
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"Wall Street pushed and pulled for more predatory practices. The people
who had the most were deeply involved in ripping off the people who had
the least."l 65
Wall Street would like Americans to believe that it is helping to fix the
crisis it caused by offering various loan modification and short sale
programs. But what is Wall Street really doing? Wall Street is operating in
the black again,166 but Main Street is still suffering. So, what is Main
Street doing about it? This, too, is business not personal.
III. WHAT'S REALLY HAPPENING?

A. Case Studies
a. Residential Mortgage
1. Case Study: Florida
Below is an actual hardship letter written in April 2009, requesting a
loan modification of a residential loan:
I am requesting a loan modification because I cannot afford
my mortgage under the current terms. I have lived in the home
since June 2007 after an expected separation from my wife in
June 2007. We divorced in August 2007 (which caused my
credit score to drop resulting in a higher interest rate than I
should have) and have suffered several setbacks since then.
However, since that time, I have been able to raise my credit
score to a good-excellent range (mid-700s).
To begin, I am a disabled Vietnam Veteran who is on a fixed
monthly income. My current loan terms include an ARM at a
present interest rate of 8.875%. Presently, my home is worth
less than $200,000 and I owe well over that amount
(approximately $275,000). In addition, I have only been able
to make the minimum payment (Option 1), which is causing
my mortgage to increase in negative amortization each month.
[Lender's loan modification company] turned me down for a
loan modification in March 2009. I am requesting that
[Lender] (not Lender's loan modification company) review my
houses not only provided shelter but also a plump nest egg").
165 SCHECHTER, supranote 3, at 36.
166 See e.g., Roben Farzad, Goldman Sachs: Don't Blame Us, BusINESS WEEK, Apr. 12, 2010, at
30, 32 (reporting that Goldman Sachs "posted a $13.4 billion profit in 2009, a Wall Street record").
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loan for a modification. Also since then, [A state bar] has
assigned to me a volunteer attorney to help me with this loan
modification under [its home ownership program. I have
copied her on this letter, and she is on file with your company
as my lawyer.
My hardship began with my unexpected and devastating
divorce from my wife of 9 years, but who I lived with for
almost 11 years total. As a result, I had to move and obtain a
mortgage for myself only. My wife said that she could not
continue to deal with my disability.
Subsequent to the divorce and soon after I refinanced my home
in 2007, my sister died in the fall of 2008 from Parkinson's
disease, and my brother-in-law died soon after in January 2009
from heart failure. This placed enormous stress on me,
including financial stress as I depleted my entire savings to
help pay the medical and funeral expenses for them.
In addition to all of the above, as a disabled Vietnam Veteran,
I must continue with medical care at the VA medical facility.
The nearest medical facility is a two hour drive from my home.
This long drive coupled with the increased frequency of visits
that I must make as well as the unpredictable and rising cost of
fuel and vehicle maintenance, have significantly contributed to
my financial drain.
I cannot continue to drive myself into a negative amortization
with my home. It is causing me severe stress on top of my
other medical conditions, and is providing me with no
financial security for the future in investing in a home.
I do not have the ability to earn additional income. I was
honorably discharged from the United States military where I
was severely wounded and remain disabled. I am alone. I do
not have a wife, and my daughter from a prior marriage is 30
and has no ability to help with my expenses. Because of my
financial situation, I have not been able to travel to see my
daughter in over 26 months. I have also not seen my mother
since my sister's death also because of my financial situation.
When the loan that I have now adjusts after the ARM ends, I
will be completely unable to pay for the home, and I will owe
so much more on the home than it is worth.
I cannot continue to do this any longer. Please help me. If I
had a fixed loan with a much lower interest rate that is now
available because the recession has caused interest rates to
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drop, that would help me. In addition, I am very responsible as
during this time, I have been able to get raise my credit score
to what it has always been in my life - good to excellent. If
nothing more, please allow me to do a short sale and move to a
home closer to the VA medical facility.167
Two months later, the borrower then wrote his congressional
representative and state administrative officer about the hardship. He
informed them:
I am contacting you because I have had no relief from my
current mortgage, even after twice submitting information to
[the lender] for a loan modification. Initially, [the lender]
denied a modification because I received too much income.
Most recently, even with little income change, I was denied
because [the lender] said I would not be able to afford a loan
modification. I have worked with [the state bar's housing
program], but still no relief from [the lender], which does not
appear to be cooperating with [the state bar] for loan relief as
other loan institutions are doing.168
The borrower received no assistance from either, and his health was
deteriorating due to stress and because he was so far from the hospital that
he had to visit several times a week for medical care.
After receiving no help from the lender or others, the borrower "walked
away" - he moved into a house closer to the VA hospital, stopped paying
the lender, and left the keys of his "underwater" home on the kitchen table.
He could have continued paying on this worthless investment because he
could afford the monthly payment, but he left because his mortgage was
heavily underwater and the loan terms were unconscionable - this is
business, not personal. His action's got the lender's attention and it began
working with the borrower. Since that time, the borrower has obtained a
buyer for the house on a short sale contract in the amount of $160,000 less than $100,000 of the balance owed on the mortgage. The lender's
appraiser was $175,000, so the lender's appraisal performed due diligence
to determine whether his appraisal was consistent with other area sale or
needed an adjustment. After concluding that the short sale contract was
$15,000 less than the market value, the lender sought the shortfall from the
buyers, who withdrew from the short sale contract. The house is back on

167 Hardship letter from a homeowner to a lender (slight modifications for anonymity) (Apr. 2009)
(on file with author).
168 Id.
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the market.
While awaiting the short sale approval, the lender filed a foreclosure
complaint, attaching the note that reflected a different lender than the
lender (plaintiff) who filed the lawsuit. This is not unusual; many lenders
do not have the proper documentation showing that they are the proper
lender.
In some cases records have been destroyed and mortgages
sliced and diced into so many pieces that it is hard to even
know who owns certain properties that have been sold or
resold worldwide. They have been packaged, bundled, and
turned into structured investment vehicles ("SIV's") or
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Many homeowners
pay bills to mortgage servicers companies, not the real owners
69
of their homes and properties.1
The borrower's response to the complaint was a motion to dismiss.170 As
of late summer 2010, the borrower was waiting for a new buyer for the
house and perhaps the lender's approval of another short sale.171 The
borrower will seek a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure ("DIL"), which "is a
disposition option in which a mortgagor voluntarily deeds collateral
property in exchange for a release from all obligations under the
mortgage." 72 This will save the lender the money that it would spend to
foreclose, and the lender may not accept the DIL if it believes the borrower
can afford the mortgage. Industry practice shows that borrowers must offer
a DIL because the lenders are not mentioning DILs, but it is better than a
foreclosure for all parties involved.

169 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 179.
170 This reveals another issue not a part of this article, but borrowers who cannot afford lawyers are
unaware of their defenses when sued; thus, the foreclosure crisis is disproportionately affecting those
with lower incomes because the mortgage companies obtain judgments (mostly be default for failing to
appear) easily against those without lawyers than those who can afford lawyers when the defendants
had valid defenses. The courts should sanction attorneys who continue to file such complaints without
the proper documents showing that the lender who is bringing the lawsuit is the lender who is on record
as owning the mortgage. The Florida Bar is disciplining attorneys who are participating in the
foreclosure debacle. See Gary Blankenship, Bar Ramps Up Foreclosure-RelatedActivities, FLORIDA
BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2010, availableat http://www.floridabar.orgfDIVCOM/JN/jnnews0l.nsf/
8c9fl 3012b96736985256aa900624829/cd7f5e65a787b897852577d20068bcde!OpenDocument.
171 Federal guidelines were established to speed up the approval process for short sales, see June
Fletcher, Speeding Up Short Sales, WALL STREET J., Apr. 9, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJPUB:SBl0001424052702304198004575171882448724258.htm
1,but this has not made a dent in the short sale approval process. Lenders are sitting on short sale offers
for months during which time the housing contract usually expires, buyers get tired of waiting, and the
lender files a foreclosure action.
172 U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Deed-in-Lieu: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/nsc/faqdil.cfm (May 15, 2009).
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Overall, the borrower has been relieved of his stress related to his
housing debt, his health has improved,173 he is unconcerned with his
current credit bureau score that moved from "excellent" to "good," and he
is enjoying his new home.
2. Case Study: Florida
In another instance, a homeowner purchased a single family home in the
summer of 2006 for $250,000. The house was recently valued at $114,000.
The borrower has a thirty year loan with only interest for the first 10 years
at a fixed rate of 6.5 percent for $200,000 and 8 percent for the remaining
$50,000. The borrower's desire is to remain in the house and she can
afford to do so; however, she has not yet explored any possibilities for loan
relief.
3. Case Study: Virginia
In another scenario, the borrower purchased a condominium for
$450,000 in 2004 that she financed with a first mortgage of $370,000 and a
second mortgage of $80,000. By 2008, the value of the condominium had
dropped to $380,000. The borrower tried to refinance the loan, but the
bank would only refinance at 80 percent of the condominium's current
value ($380,000) and expected the borrower to bring $126,000 to closing.
As a result, the borrower obtained a buyer for a short sale of the property.
The junior lien holder rejected the short sale, and the condominium was
ultimately foreclosed. Although the law provided that junior lien holders
had the right to veto the sale or modification, 174 industry practice reveals
that often the first lien holder would share the proceeds with the
cooperating second (junior) lien holder in a short sale.
For example in another Florida case, a house was purchased for
$310,000 in 2004, appraised at $424,000 and refinanced in 2006. The
house then sold for $240,000 in a short sale in 2009. The first lien holder
173 Debt
Stress
Causing Health
Problems,
Poll
Finds, June
9,
2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25060719/ ("When people are dealing with mountains of debt, they're
much more likely to report health problems, too, according to an Associated Press-AOL Health poll.
And not just little stuff; this means ulcers, severe depression, even heart attacks. ... 'Although most
people appear to be managing their debts all right, perhaps 10 million to 16 million are "suffering
terribly due to their debts, and their health is likely to be negatively impacted,' says Paul J. Lavrakas, a
research psychologist and AP consultant who analyzed the results of the survey. 'Those are people who
reported high levels of debt stress and suffered from at least three stress-related illnesses, he says."').
174 ZANDI, supra note 7, at 209 ("The law gave second mortgage holders the right to veto loan
modifications; yet in the kinds of loan write-downs being proposed, they stood to lose everything. A
foreclosure would be no better - junior liens would likely be wiped out in either case - but many
second mortgage holders reasoned they had nothing to lose by vetoing a modification.").
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was owed roughly $345,000 and the second lien holder (HELOC) was
owed roughly $40,000; the first lien holder agreed to accept approximately
$205,000 net proceeds and any junior lien holder could receive no more
than $11,500 net proceeds, which the junior lien holder accepted. Over a
year after the home's closing, the junior lien holder notified the borrower
that it waived its right to the deficiency. This is likely a result of President
Obama's administration's and states' attorneys generals pressure for these
large lenders to work with the American people, as well as the ongoing
investigations that so many of the large lenders are now facing and the
repeated findings of wrongdoing by these large lenders.
4. Case Study: California
In this scenario, a family bought a home in 1990 for $200,000. The
home's value increased to over $800,000, during which time the
homeowners took money out for college expenses and other things. The
home is now valued at $200,000, and the family owes well over the current
value of the house.
b. Commercial Mortgage
The commercial mortgage lending business went south too. Indeed,
commercial property lending is said to be in a much worse condition than
subprime home property lending.175 Wall Street is similarly unhelpful to its
commercial clients as well.
In another scenario, a borrower bought commercial investment, incomeproducing property in 2005 valued at roughly $825,000 and paid 20 percent
down. The borrower refinanced with a major lender (which later went into
bankruptcy) in 2007 to an ARM at 7 percent for 5 years and after the loan
could increase to 12 percent for the next 35 years (40 year loan), depending
upon the current interest rate. At this time, the property was valued by the
lender's appraiser near $1.2 million.176 Then in 2009, the borrower, trying
to survive the impact of the recession, sought a loan modification from the
current mortgage holder, which was not the lender who refinanced the
property in 2007. At all times, the borrower's credit was "very good" and
would have been considered a creditworthy (or prime) borrower.
Nevertheless, the borrower was only offered yet another subprime loan an ARM that changes every 6 months with a balloon payment in three
175 Krugman, supra note 78.
176 Ridge & Rushak, supra note 146, at 13 (noting that Washington Mutual used appraisers who
would inflate the home values).
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years. Thus, in three years (now two), the borrower must either refinance
or sell the property that is heavily "underwater." This time, the lender's
appraiser valued the property at approximately $450,000 and the lender did
not willingly disclose the appraisal value to the borrower. Because the
current interest rate is at an historic 50 year lOW,1 77 the mortgage payments
(ARMs initial payments) have been unusually low - perhaps to the dismay
of the lender, another Wall Street giant - but with the variable interest rate,
every six months is a "wait-and-see": will the mortgage go up, stay the
same, or go down? Thus far, the mortgage payment has gone down every
six months since the loan's inception because mortgage rates hit historic
lows.
B. Strategic Defaults
As reflected above, the current housing crisis began with defaults from
the low- to moderate-income borrowers, who had little money elsewhere to
draw from in this recession. The crisis now is stuck in the middle class,
many of whom have lost their employment, and is also among the upper
middle class and the wealthy. "The surprisingly high number of subprime
loans among more credit-worthy borrowers shows how far such mortgages
have spread into the economy-including middle-class and wealthy
communities where they once were scarce."1 78 Those borrowers who really
could not afford their homes - generally lower income with subprime loans
in which the ARM ended-have already defaulted.1 79 The borrowers left
are those whose homes are deeply underwater but who can afford their
loan, even if the payment they can afford continues to put them into
negative amortization (option ARM), as they sink money into a valueless
asset.180 "Proposed solutions that would keep more people who aren't
behind on their mortgage payments in their homes and stabilize the market
have largely been ignored."' 8' Additionally, lenders have not been
amenable to modifying underwater mortgages even if it would be socially
177 Ann Brenoff, Mortgage Rates Hit 50 Year Low, HUFFINGTON POST, June 28, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/28/mortgage-rates-hit-50-yea-n_627529.html (discussing the
positive and negative news associated with experiencing the lowest mortgage rate in more than 50
years).
178 Brooks, supra note 75.
179 Double-DipDrama, supranote 139, at 35.
180 Id. ("And a growing number of underwater borrowers are opting simply to walk away from
mortgages that they can in fact afford.").
181 Beth Kassab, Where's the Relief for Homeowners Who Played by the Rules?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 20, 2010, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-05-20/business/oskassab-foreclosure-solution-05212020100520 1 underwater-homeowners-mortgage-payments-default.
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and morally responsible for them to modify them to do so. 182 Many lenders
are prolonging the inevitable rather than fixing the problem by modifying
loans with more subprime terms and conditions; thus, in the next 3-5 years,
there will likely be another wave of defaults for residential and commercial
property. This wave of defaults will likely also evince the discriminatory
manner in which lenders are modifying loans - less educated borrowers are
receiving considerably worse terms and conditions.1 83 Educated borrowers
often have the aid of legal counsel and knowledge of other resources than
less educated borrowers.
These case studies reflect what is really happening on Main Street with
residential and commercial properties - Wall Street is not helping as much
as they would like Americans to believe.184 They have not discontinued
subprime loans to prime customers and others, and they refuse to allow
borrowers out of "bad loans," especially if the borrower can afford the bad
loan.
Thus, many Americans are "strategically defaulting." They are walking
away, even when they can afford the loan, because it is no longer a good
investment.185 In addition, so often the borrower is in a bad loan - a
subprime loan. Some borrowers are afraid to just walk away, but higher
income borrowers are "less susceptible to the shame and fear-mongering
used by the government and the mortgage banking industry to keep
underwater homeowners from acting in their financial best interest." 1 86
Strategic defaults are increasing and are being heavily criticized. 187
"Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two quasi-governmental mortgage
finance companies that own most of the mortgages in America with a value
of less than $500,000, are alternately pleading with distressed homeowners
182 White, supra note 7, at 2 (distinguishing the influences that affect lenders versus individual
homeowners when dealing with mortgages).
183 In one case, the borrower (lower income) was in default and the lender gave the borrower a
reduced payment for four months, then the lender tacked the amount in arrears to the end of the loan.
184 See e.g., Beatrice Garcia, Florida's Broward County Officials Take a Stand Against BofA,
March 15, 2010, http://www.housingwatch.com/2010/03/15/broward-county-officials-take-a-standagainst-bofal (reporting that Broward County Board of Commissioners penalized Bank of America
because the Commission believes that Bank of America is wrongly seizing people's homes and not
properly processing and approving loan modifications).
185 Double-Dip Drama, supra note 139, at 35 (discussing how homeowners are walking away from
their mortgages to avoid suffering a huge loss upon sale); Streitfeld, supra note 133, at Al (noting the
recent trend in Silicon Valley of upper class homeowners with lavish properties defaulting on their
mortgages).
186 Streitfeld, supra note 133, at Al (quoting Professor Brent White, a University of Arizona law
professor who has studied strategic defaults).
187 White, supra note 7, at 25 ("The clear message to American homeowners from nearly all fronts
is that one has a moral responsibility to pay one's mortgage. The message is conveyed not only by
political, social, and economic institutions, but by the majority of Americans who believe that
voluntarily defaulting on a mortgage is immoral.")
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not to be bad citizens and brandishing a stick at them." 188 Indeed, Fannie
Mae recently increased the penalty for those who it believes have
strategically defaulted.189 An ethics professor opined that borrowers who
can pay their mortgage and were not deceived by the lender (that is, does
not have a subprime loan) have a "moral responsibility" to continue to pay
the mortgage; otherwise, it would destroy the American economy if
borrowers walked away from their commitments. 190 Wall Street and others
are calling for Main Street to be honorable in the repayment of their
mortgage debts, so as not to "trash their communities."1 9 1 This too was the
case with Tulipmania in which there was a "fear, the fear of disorder, was
justified, because when the question was one of honor - of the repayment
of debts, of the breaking of obligations - the consequences for the
community could be dire."1 92
But it was the banks who trashed the nation's communities; the subprime
crisis was a "heist by banks," targeting the American people, enriching a
few and destroying whole neighborhoods. 193 The subprime crisis has been
called a "white-collar crime wave." 1 94 Crimes committed by mortgage
brokers who originated loans to borrowers who did not comprehend the
terms, could not afford to pay the loan, and should not have qualified;
appraisers who overvalued property to obtain additional business from
dishonest brokers; and banks and brokerage firms that originated or bought,
packaged, and resold the mortgages for stiff fees. 195 The crimes committed
were 'substantial' and in every state in the country. 196
188 Streitfeld, supra note 133, at Al.
189 News Release, supra note 138 ("Defaulting borrowers who walk-away and had the capacity to
pay or did not complete a workout alternative in good faith will be ineligible for a new Fannie Maebacked mortgage loan for a period of seven years from the date of foreclosure.... Fannie Mae will also
take legal action to recoup the outstanding mortgage debt from borrowers who strategically default on
their loans in jurisdictions that allow for deficiency judgments.").
190 James R. Hagerty & Nick Timiraos, Debtor's Dilemma: Pay the Mortgage or Walk Away,
WALL STREET J., Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB126100

260600594531.html.
191 Gold, supra note 157, at 205 (foreclosures negatively impact neighborhoods).
192 GOLDGAR, supra note 17, at 251.
193

SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at 13.

194 Id. 23, 124 (reporting that the Attorney General indicated that a special task force will be
created to investigate whether there was wrongdoing in the mortgage lending agency); see Becky
Quick, Why No Jail Time for Wall Street, CNN Money, June 23, 1010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/06
/23/news/companies/prosecutors ignoringwallstreet.fortune/index.htm (asking where the jail time is
for those who oversaw the subprime mortgage crisis); but see Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An
Eyewitness Reportfrom Ground Zero in Cleveland's Neighborhood's, 17 J. AFF. HouS. & COM. DEV.
L. 237, 253 (2008) (noting that the defendants in recent civil cases are lenders and investment banks,
and that brokers, appraisers, and borrowers are being indicted in criminal cases).
195 SCHECHTER supra note 3, at 24 (quoting Basil Williams, CEO of a hedge fund).
196 Id. at 31(quoting FBI director Robert Mueller).
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It is estimated that roughly 14 million homeowners are currently
underwater, and this is expected to increase to 20 million by the end of
2011.197 "Lenders are fearful that many of the 11 million or so
homeowners who owe more than their house is worth will walk away from
them, especially if the real estate market begins to weaken again. The socalled strategic defaults have become a matter of intense debate in recent
months." 1 9 8 After the Tulipmania crash, "some honorable people"
attempted to pay something on their debts, but most of the debtors did
not. 199 And so it may be with American borrowers because they are opting
for strategic defaults.
Because of the current economic climate, many homeowners are
seriously considering a strategic default. In fact, strategic defaults are
expected to increase. 200 Some homeowners consider strategic defaults to be
immoral:
When I sign a contract, it is not just ink. I have given my word.
Events can happen that make carrying out a contract and
making good on your word impossible. Events that make it
hard, uncomfortable, inconvenient and unprofitable are not
reason enough to break your word. Just walking away from a
binding contract should have a lasting effect on a person's
ability to borrow again. 2 01
In a recent study, roughly 80% replied that it was morally wrong to walk
away from a house when they could afford to pay the monthly note. 202 And
others do not:
As a homeowner that is currently employing a strategic
default, I take exception to your description of my decision as
immoral. I chose to walk away in order to save myself
financially from a bottomless pit. Should I risk my entire
197 Lita Epstein, 20 Million Homeowners Projectedto Be Underwater by End of 2011, HOUSING
WATCH, Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.housingwatch.com/2010/08/05/20-millionhomeowners-projected-to-be-underwater-by-end-of-20 11/.
198 Streitfeld, supranote 133, at Al.
199 GOLDGAR, supranote 17, at 251.
200 Jody Shenn, "Strategic" Mortgage Defaults Jump to 12 Percent of Total, BUSINESS WEEK,
Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/-strategic-mortgagedefaults-jump-to-12-of-total-update3-.html.
201 Beth Kassab, Readers Write on Mortgage Morality, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 25, 2010,
availableat http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-kassab-letters0526201020100525,0,1895697
.column.

202 Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 10, 19 (Fin.
Trust Index, Working Paper, July 2009), available at http://www.financialtrustindex.org/images/Guiso_
SapienzaZingales_StrategicDefault.pdf.
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financial life, my family's financial life and my retirement on a
single house? I don't believe that I did anything IMMORAL. I
tried for a year to work things out with the bank, but THEY
refused. They left me in a position to make a serious decision
about my financial future. One that I didn't take lightly. One
that will ruin my credit. One that I will be paying for years to
203
come. I don't just get a free ride by walking away!
"I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it anymore." I
guess that is where I and many other hard-working Americans
are just now. That is why they are walking away in droves
from their mortgages and are voting out the establishment. 204
One legal scholar stated: "It's simply wrong, in my opinion, to ask
underwater homeowners to accept their own financial ruin for the common
good, especially when the housing collapse was caused primarily by the
mortgage industry and the government's failed policies,. . . [a mortgage] is
purely a legal document, not a sacred promise." 205 He argues that a
strategic default is similar to terminating a mobile phone contract if you
find a better deal with a different carrier. 206 In addition, attorneys and
others advisors are recommending to homeowners that strategic defaults
may be the best solution in the homeowners' situation. 2 07
Some economists assert that strategic defaults may not be an ideal
solution in some situations because of economic reasons, such as: 1) the
interest on the mortgage may be less than renting another house; 2) moving
incurs relocation costs; 3) the defaulter's credit bureau score will
decline; 208 and 4) the defaulter may face a deficiency judgment if the
203 Kassab, supra note 201.
204 Id.
205 Beth Kassab, Is It Wrong To Walk Away From Your Mortgage When You Can Still
Pay?,ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 2010, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-0519/business/os-kassab-mortgage-morality-05192010-20100519_Iunderwater-homeowners-luigizingales-mortgage-industry (quoting Professor Brent White).
206 Id.

207 See
e.g.,
Kaufman,
Englett
&
Lynd,
PLLC,
Strategic
Default,
www.dominionrealtynation.com/strategic-default.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011) ("This is the situation
where a strategic default makes sense. A strategic default involves deliberately failing to pay a
mortgage despite being able to do so. Obviously, a strategic default must be very carefully considered
in order to be effective. Unless you are confident that a strategic default is the best move for you, you
should seek other options."); see also, Carman Law Firm, P.A., Considering Walking Away from Your
Home?: Strategic Default, www.floridaforeclosuredefenders.com/Foreclosure-Defense/StrategicDefault.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); YouWalkAway, www.youwalkaway.com (last visited Feb. 10,
2011) (providing foreclosure information from real estate professionals to assist owners of underwater
homes to strategically walk away from their properties).
208 While the FICO score may decline roughly 130-140 points, it often springs back in a few
months to where its pre-default level assuming the consumer has good credit otherwise. However, the
foreclosure or short sale indication will remain on the defaulter's credit record for seven years.
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mortgage is a recourse-loan, which allows creditors to pursue the
deficiency of the mortgage balance after the resale value of the house. 209
But these concerns pale in comparison to overwhelming debt coupled with
a loan with risky terms and conditions. Furthermore, the homeowners who
have been so bold as to "walk away" from their bad loans, experience little
of what these experts are cautioning. Professor White said it best:
[T]here is in fact a huge financial upside to strategic default for
seriously underwater homeowners - an upside that is routinely
ignored by the media, credit counseling agencies, and other
political and economic institutions in "informing" homeowners
about the consequences of default. Moreover, the costs of
default are not nearly as extreme as these same institutions
typically misrepresent them to be. In reality: homeowners face
no risk of a deficiency judgment in many states or, regardless
of the state, for FHA loans or loans held by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac; even in recourse states, lenders are unlikely to
pursue a deficiency judgment because it is economically
inefficient to do so; there is no tax liability on "forgiven
portions" of home mortgages under current federal tax law in
effect until 2012; defaulting on one's mortgage does not mean
that one's other credit lines will be revoked; and most people
can expect to recover from the negative impact of foreclosure
on their credit score within two year years (and, meanwhile,
two years of poor credit need not seriously impact one's
life. 210
The reality is that a strategic default may be the best course of option
when you are locked in a bad loan. Even corporate housing lending
executives believe that walking away may be the best option for some
homeowners. 2 11 This applies to residential and commercial properties.
Recommended courses of action are not a one size fits all, but rather a
property owners' individual situation must be considered on a case by case
basis. Companies understanding the current economic national and global
crisis are developing programs and guidelines for people who may have a
mortgage default on their credit. 2 12 Strategic defaults - properly named 209 Guiso, supra note 202, at 3 (explaining that a defaulter may face a deficiency judgment for the
amount of his home).
210 White, supra note 7, at 32-33.
211 Streitfeld, supra note 133 (providing an example where a corporate executive suggested that
walking away from an underwater home may be a good option).
212 See, e.g., The Golden I Credit Union, www.goldenI.com/loans/mortgageassistance (last visited
Feb. 12, 2011) (advertising many individualized options to its constituents who have been adversely
affected by the mortgage crisis).
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may in some cases be the best option for the property owner.
Most homeowners who are underwater in their homes continue to pay
2 13 And one
despite knowing that they will likely never recoup their losses.
scholar advises that: "Homeowners should be walking away in droves. But
they aren't." 214 Fear, shame, guilt, and possible retribution have stifled
homeowners from considering all of their housing options. 2 15 Not only fear
and guilt, but there is also envy among homeowners who have not been so
bold as to walk away - they argue that indeed they are now paying for the
costs of the walkway's defaulted loan. The non-walkaways want to join
the ranks of the walkaways, but they are embarrassed and terrified.
Wall Street was savvy enough to get America in this subprime mess, but
has come up short with remedies to help the real victims - Main Street.
Lenders do not want borrowers to walk away, but rather stay in underwater
homes with subprime terms and conditions. But, instead of foreclosing on
homeowners, destroying their credit (thus preventing them from obtaining
employment), 2 16 and evicting them from their homes, or modifying
subprime loans with more subprime terms and conditions which will cause
another wave of defaults, lenders should consider some viable options or a
combination thereof.
One idea is for the lender to take back the mortgage and allow the
borrower to remain in the home and rent it back at the fair market value
("FMV"). The borrower would not be able to move unless he found
another borrower to rent the house, but the banks would be the ones to wait
out this crisis while holding the note. Any equity that accrues would go to
the lender; the borrower then is not accruing equity nor liability and still
has a place to live, and the lender is not holding empty homes and
destroying neighborhoods. If the original borrower continues to live on the
property (instead of moving and finding another person to rent the home),
then the lender and borrower may agree to share any equity that accrues
while the original borrower is still there.
Another consideration is that the lenders could readjust or modify the
213 White, supra note 7, at 971-72 (analyzing why homeowners would rather pay off their
mortgage though their houses are worth far less than the mortgage).
214 Id. at 983.
215 Id. at 935-95 (discussing the sociological reasons as to why underwater homeowners are
reluctant to default on their mortgage).
216 Liz Pulliam Weston, How Bad Credit Can Cost You a Job, MSN Money,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/YourCreditRatinghow-bad-credit-can-cost-you-ajob.aspx (Aug. 17, 2009) ("A fair chunk of employers want to examine your credit history before
offering you a position or a promotion. Blotches there -- repossessions, collections, high credit card
balances -- could cost you the job you want. For example, applicants for Transportation Security
Administration airport screener jobs are rejected if they have more than $5,000 in overdue debt.").
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note by 1) reducing the interest rate to 1 or 2 percent of the current
underwater mortgage balance of $250,000 (residential case study 2 above);
or 2) reducing the loan to the current FMV of $114,000 (residential case
study 2 above) and the interest rate to the current interest rate of 4.44
percent, which rate is being wasted because borrowers are unable to qualify
under the stricter refinance lending guidelines, requiring a FICO score of
620 or above, a higher down payment, and lower monthly debt service
ratios. 217 However, loan modifications do not need to qualify as it is not a
refinance. These options may allow the owner to remain in the home and if
there is a sale and any equity at the time of the sale, then the lender and
homeowner can share the equity.
Another solution that may help some homeowners maintain their homes
is for lenders to modify the existing loans (including those underwater) to
the current, historic interest rate of 4.44 percent. The lender will still have
the same collateral - the house - that it currently has, but the borrower will
have lower monthly payments, and therefore, is more likely to avoid
foreclosure. What good is a high interest rate to the lender if the borrower
cannot afford it? Thus, the lender will cut its losses and the buyer will keep
the home, avoiding issues with squatters taking over vacant properties. 2 18
The only risk to the lender is if a foreclosure occurs, then the house will
sell for less than the value of the mortgage. This is exactly the same risk the
lenders currently face. This proposal would mitigate some of the risk
because lenders would be able to avoid some foreclosures while receiving
additional payments from some borrowers, who ultimately default, even
with the reduced payments. The lenders keep asking Main Street, the
victims, to wait this crisis out, but they should be the ones to wait it out.
Additionally, this subprime crisis will be further impacted by collection
companies buying deficiency judgments from foreclosures, deed-in-lieu of
foreclosures, or short sales. Absent regulatory or legislative intervention,
more collection companies will buy the deficiency judgments for pennies
on the dollar and try to collect 100% from the debtor/borrower. 2 19 If that
217 Nin-Hai Tseng, The Wasted 4.44% Mortgage Rate, CNN Money, Aug. 16, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/13/realestate/mortgagerates refinancing.fortune/index.htm
(discussing the all-time low mortgage rates that are inaccessible to those who need to refinance most).
218 John Leland, With Advocates'Help, Squatters Call ForeclosuresHome, N.Y. TIMES, April 10,
2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/us/10squatter.html ("Michael Stoops,
executive director of the National Coalition for the Homeless, said about a dozen advocacy groups
around the country were actively moving homeless people into vacant homes - some working in
secret, others, like Take Back the Land, operating openly. In addition to squatting, some advocacy
groups have organized civil disobedience actions in which borrowers or renters refuse to leave homes
after foreclosure.").
219 Kimberly Miller, Borrowers Beware: Firms Profit Off Defaults, PALM BEACH POST, June 12,
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happens, "[i]t's going to be a blood bath." 220 This "deficiency" is due to the
fraudulent and deceptive business practices used by mortgage brokers,
appraisers, and lenders - that is, the loan was fraudulent at its inception, so
collection companies should not be able to benefit from the deceptive
activity of the team of persons who originated the loan, appraised the
property, and funded the subprime loan. The state and federal governments
need to enact protections - legislative protections - now, so that the
economic recovery of America is not further stymied by collection
companies chasing borrowers years after they have separated from their
property where so often the borrower was deceived at the inception of the
mortgage loan.
There will also likely be another wave of defaults within the next few
years because loan modification ARMs will end on residential and
commercial properties. Furthermore, prime borrowers with non-traditional
mortgages will see their mortgages reset, and many will be unable to afford
the increase. 22 1 Sadly, true loan modifications are just not happening. 22 2 As
a result, many borrowers with loan modifications have re-defaulted 2 23
because the lenders are not providing significant relief to home owners.
Perhaps this is in part because lenders are trying to overcompensate for the
losses due to the long overdue reforms with the credit card industry which
224
was needlessly profiting off of consumers in unconscionable ways.
Without true loan modifications the defaults and foreclosures will continue.

2010, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/real-estate/borrowers-beware-firms-profitoff-defaults-744186.html (reporting that a cottage industry of entrepreneurs will begin buying
deficiency judgments from foreclosures or short sales and making borrowers pay up); Michael
McCauley & Megan Ryan, Debt Collection Abuses on the Rise During Tough Economic Times:
Advocates Call for Stronger Protections for Consumers, ConsumersUnion.org (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core financialservices/017368.html ("Buying and selling debt is
essentially an unregulated industry.").
220 Miller, supra note 219 (quoting an owner of a short sale operation).
221 SCHECHTER, supra note 3, at xxiii (stating that Sheila C. Blair, chairperson of the FDIC,
warned a Senate Banking Committee panel that "in 2009, $600 billion worth of prime borrowers will
see their "non-traditional" mortgages reset, and many won't be able to find the cash").
222 Miller, supranote 219 (noting that Joshua Rand, a principal in the New York-based Deficiency
Judgment Recovery Network, expressed that "[pleople are under the assumption that the banks are so
busy modifying home loans that they don't have the bandwidth or stomach to go after those who are
walking away. That's a bad assumption").
223 Lita Epstein, Mortgage Mods: Most BorrowersAre Likely to Redefault Within a Year, June 18,
2010, http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2010/06/18/mortgage-mods-most-borrowers-are-likely-to-redefaultwithin-a-y/; Tami Luhby, Borrowers Flunking Out of Trial Mortgage Modifications,CNN Money, May
17, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/17/news/economy/HAMPmodifications/index.htm.
224 See e.g., Lita Epstein, JPMorganChase Is No Fan of Latest Obama Plan to Stem Foreclosures,
Apr. 13, 2010, http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2010/04/13/jpmorgan-chase-is-no-fan-of-latest-obamaplan-to-stem-foreclosur/ (reporting that Chase is opposed to principal reductions of mortgages and
Chase CEO "complained that the credit card reforms alone will cost Chase between $500 million and
$750 million in after-tax income").
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"If [defaults and foreclosures continue], losses will deepen for investors
and lenders, home values will plummet for surrounding communities, and
the entire economy will suffer." 22 5
And if all else fails for these borrowers, then a strategic default, in the
words of Freddie Mac's executive, "might well be a good decision for
certain borrowers." 226
CONCLUSION

The economy is showing small signs of recovery. Unemployment
appears to be going down. Bankruptcy filings and foreclosures, however,
continue to increase largely because housing prices continue to decrease.
The media tends to focus on the problems of Wall Street, yet there are far
greater challenges facing the millions of Americans who have lost or are
facing loss of their jobs and their homes. Wall Street appears to have gone
back to business as usual, and the help that Wall Street is providing Main
Street is dismal. Wall Street may be recovering from a cold, but Main
Street has pneumonia. 227

225 Krimminger, supra note 49, at 265.
226 Streitfeld, supra note 133.
227 See TheBigApple.com, When Wall Street Sneezes, The Rest of the World Catches Pneumonia,
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/newyorkcity/entry/whenwallstreet sneezestherestof the
worldcatches_pneumonia when ameri/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) ("Wall Street influences Main
Street and even the rest of the world. 'When Wall Street sneezes,' the saying goes, 'the rest of the world
catches pneumonia.' The phrase has several variations, with 'America' or 'United States' replacing
Wall Street and with 'cold' replacing 'pneumonia."').

